Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (INTC)

Located just southeast of Isfahan city in central Iran, the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (INTC) is Iran’s largest and most comprehensive nuclear research complex. With a thermal capacity of about 10 megawatts, the site includes a variety of nuclear reactors and fuel cycle facilities that serve both civilian and dual-use purposes.

INTC hosts several types of reactors, including a Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) supplied by China, as well as subcritical assemblies using light water, heavy water, and graphite moderators [1]. These are used primarily for research in nuclear physics, radiological studies, training, and materials testing. The center also supports the production of medical isotopes and fuels used in other Iranian research reactors, such as the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) [2].

Interactive Map of Iran’s Nuclear Sites

A key component of INTC is its Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF), where uranium ore concentrate (yellowcake) is converted into various compounds—most notably uranium hexafluoride (UF₆), which is essential for enrichment processes at Natanz and Fordow [3]. INTC also includes a Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant, essential for manufacturing low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel assemblies for research reactors, and a Metallic Uranium Production Unit, a sensitive capability often scrutinized due to its potential role in weapons design [4].

The center was originally developed in the 1970s and 1980s, with technical assistance from China and France. China, in particular, supplied the MNSR and supported early fuel conversion research, while French companies were involved in early designs before the 1979 Iranian Revolution [5].

As of 2025, the INTC employs an estimated 3,000 nuclear scientists, engineers, and support personnel, making it one of the most heavily staffed nuclear centers in the Middle East [6]. The facility is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under Iran’s safeguards agreement and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA)—though monitoring effectiveness has varied depending on Iran’s compliance and political developments [7].

The Isfahan complex is considered a strategic node in Iran’s nuclear supply chain, given its role in converting uranium, fabricating nuclear fuel, and supporting technical research and training. It is frequently mentioned in IAEA reports and global proliferation assessments due to its infrastructure and potential dual-use capabilities [8]. Following Israeli airstrikes during the 2025 escalation, parts of the INTC were reportedly damaged, including the metallic uranium production and fuel plate fabrication areas [9].

Here’s the detailed information available from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concerning the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center (INRC):

Pre-Conflict Verification & Safeguards (June 2025 Board)

• Advanced Enrichment Monitoring: The IAEA’s June 9 2025 Director‑General’s introductory report noted Iran’s increasing stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU)—over 400 kg—raising serious proliferation concerns (iaea.org).
• Safeguards Shortcomings: Iran continues to refuse implementation of modified Code 3.1, which is legally required to enable early monitoring of new nuclear facilities such as those in Isfahan (iaea.org).
• Outstanding Safeguards Issues: The agency reported unresolved discrepancies in uranium accounting—especially at the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility and Jaber Ibn Hayan Laboratories—where material remains “unaccounted for” (eeas.europa.eu).

Pre-War Monitoring: Surveillance in Isfahan

• In late 2024, the IAEA had installed and maintained surveillance cameras in centrifuge workshops at Isfahan gardens, used to track centrifuge rotor and bellows activity.
• On December 30, 2023, inspectors serviced these cameras, although Iran retained control over the data, sealed by IAEA (armscontrol.org).
• The agency has requested access to stored data, which Iran has refused, citing dependencies on the revival of the 2015 nuclear deal (armscontrol.org).

Impact of Israeli Strikes on INRC (Mid‑June 2025)

• June 13 redeployment: Israel struck four critical buildings at Isfahan, including the uranium conversion, fuel‑plate fabrication, and uranium metal production facilities, plus a fourth unspecified structure (wsj.com).
• IAEA’s assessment: Despite “significant damage,” the agency confirmed no increase in radiation levels at Isfahan or other sites like Natanz and Fordow. They did, however, identify potential internal contamination hazards—especially with chemical agents like uranium hexafluoride (wsj.com).
• Structural vs. functional damage: Satellite imagery indicates above-ground structural destruction, while underground facilities may remain intact, though detailed inspections are pending.

Radiological & Chemical Safety Outlook

• Minimal external hazard: As of mid‑June, IAEA monitoring shows no radiological release beyond the site boundary, though internal zones may pose chemical risks, particularly UF₆ exposure (reuters.com).
• IAEA warning: Rafael Grossi emphasized that attacks on nuclear infrastructure could risk both chemical and radiological contamination, and urged extreme caution (reuters.com).

Ongoing Oversight Challenges

• Inspectors still in-country, but access to damaged facilities is pending safety clearance (iranwatch.org).
• Transparency blind spots: Iran’s continued control over surveillance data and refusal to apply Code 3.1 limits IAEA’s ability to fully verify activities at Isfahan (iaea.org).
• Unlocated HEU stockpile: Grossi has explicitly stated he is unsure of HEU’s current storage location, with a suspicion it may include Isfahan’s inventories—confirmed only once inspectors can safely assess the site (wsj.com).

What to Expect

1. On-site damage assessment: The IAEA will inspect structural damage and survey any internal contamination at Isfahan once safe access is granted.
2. Radiological safety checks: Continued environmental sampling to ensure no offsite contamination.
3. Stockpile accounting: Confirming quantities and locations of HEU and verifying it specifically in relation to Isfahan.
4. Safeguards restoration push: Reinforcing Iran’s adherence to Code 3.1, surveillance data delivery, and full cooperation on outstanding material discrepancies.
5. Transparency imperative: Without stronger implementation of safeguards, the IAEA cannot assure that Iran’s program remains peaceful—especially post‑strikes (apnews.com, iaea.org).

✅ Summary of IAEA Findings on Isfahan

The IAEA remains actively engaged, but the combination of military damage and limited access control by Iran severely hampers its verification capacity. Until full site inspections, surveillance data access, and restored safeguards obligations happen, the agency cannot confirm the peaceful nature of activities at Isfahan—especially concerning undeclared HEU stocks and conversion/fabrication infrastructure.

June 2025 Strikes & Damage

During “Operation Rising Lion” commencing on June 13, 2025, Israel carried out a blitz of airstrikes—around 200 aircraft hitting 100+ sites across Iran—including INTC (theguardian.com). According to sources:

• The metallic uranium production facility was damaged or destroyed
• The uranium conversion facility was hit
• The fuel-plate fabrication plant sustained damage
• A fourth “critical building” at the center was also struck (en.wikipedia.org).

The IAEA confirmed “significant damage” to INTC’s above-ground structures. However, underground or deeper infrastructure may yet be intact .

Impact & Implications

• Nuclear Setback: Israel asserts that these strikes could delay Iran’s nuclear capabilities by 2–3 years (theguardian.com).
• Radiological Concern: The IAEA and UN warn that targeting nuclear sites risks chemical and radiological contamination. So far, no offsite radiation has been detected, but internal contamination is feared (apnews.com).
• Iran’s Reaction & Strategy: Iran has vowed self-defense amid heavy missile reprisals. Ahead of the strikes, Tehran had ramped up enrichment (tracking 60 % purity) and improved site protection—suggesting concern over attacks like this (reddit.com).

Conflict Context (June 2025)

• Timeline: Strikes began June 13 under “Operation Rising Lion” and escalated through the second week with renewed attacks near Isfahan’s nuclear research facility (theguardian.com).
• Casualties & Damage: Iran reports 400–639 dead, thousands injured; Israel claims 14 killed on its side amid missile barrages (politico.com).
• Diplomatic Fallout: UN and European envoys call for calm. Russia and China urge restraint. U.S. confirms intelligence sharing with Israel but denies direct involvement .
• Nuclear Negotiations: All diplomatic efforts—including planned Geneva talks—have been sidelined due to the hostilities .

What Lies Ahead

1. Reconstruction or Further Strikes: Iran faces a pivotal choice—either rebuild INTC’s capabilities or fortify underground assets and accelerate its nuclear timeline.
2. IAEA Monitoring: Inspectors remain in Iran, though activity is disrupted. Continued inspections are essential to assess contamination and recovery progress (apnews.com).
3. Escalation Risk: The attacks mark a dangerous precedent—hitting nuclear infrastructure dramatically raises stakes, with both sides pointing to regime change and self-defense goals (reddit.com).
4. Regional Security Dynamics: With potential U.S. involvement, deterrence dynamics will shift. Iran may accelerate enrichment to build a deeper “nuclear deterrent shield” .

✅ Summary

• INTC Profile: A vital nuclear hub housing conversion, fabrication, and research functions.
• Damage: Sustained “significant damage” to multiple critical buildings.
• Strategic Impact: Likely delays Iran’s nuclear timeline; possible contamination concerns.
• Conflict Role: Central target in Israel’s latest military campaign; reflects shift to direct, high-stakes strikes.
• Outlook: Focus now turns to recovery, safeguards, enrichment response, and risk of deeper escalation.

References

1. IAEA Safeguards Report (2022): “Iran: Research Reactors and Subcritical Assemblies,” IAEA.org
2. NTI – Iran Nuclear Facilities Profile: https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/isfahan-nuclear-technology-center/
3. ISIS Report on Iranian Fuel Cycle Infrastructure (2021): David Albright, et al. – “Uranium Conversion and Enrichment in Iran.”
4. IAEA Director General’s Report (June 2023 & 2025): https://www.iaea.org/newscenter
5. Albright & Hibbs (2004): “Iranian Nuclear Program: Origins and French–Chinese Cooperation,” Carnegie Endowment
6. Nuclear Archive Documents (Mossad Retrieval): Institute for Science and International Security – “Personnel & Structure of INTC,” (2018)
7. JCPoA Monitoring Reports: IAEA Reports, especially GOV/2023/30 and GOV/2025/15
8. UN Panel of Experts on Iran, 2023-2024: Security Council Reports, “Annexes on Isfahan Fuel Capabilities.”
9. AP & Reuters (June 2025): “Israeli Airstrikes Damage Isfahan Nuclear Facilities,” Reuters | AP News

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