Syrian-Saudi Relations after Assad

RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA - FEBRUARY 2: (----EDITORIAL USE ONLY - MANDATORY CREDIT - 'BANDAR ALGALOUD / SAUDI ROYAL COURT / HANDOUT' - NO MARKETING NO ADVERTISING CAMPAIGNS - DISTRIBUTED AS A SERVICE TO CLIENTS----) Syria's interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa (L) is welcomed by Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (R) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on February 2, 2025. (Photo by Bandar Algaloud / Saudi Royal Court / Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images)

This article will focus on Syrian–Saudi Relations after Assad. The fall of Assad removes the primary obstacle to full Arab and Western re-engagement with Syria.

Introduction

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 marked a pivotal moment in Syrian history. This event not only ended over five decades of Assad family rule but also set the stage for a significant shift in Syria’s foreign relations. Among the most notable developments is the re-establishment of diplomatic ties between Syria and Saudi Arabia, signaling a new era of cooperation and strategic realignment in the Middle East. This article will focus on Syrian–Saudi Relations after Assad.

The fall of Assad removes the primary obstacle to full Arab and Western re-engagement with Syria. Lifting U.S. sanctions is now a pragmatic catalyst rather than a diplomatic gamble. Saudi Arabia’s role will likely be central—both as a financier and strategic partner—in shaping a post-war Syrian order that tilts toward the Arab mainstream and away from the Iranian axis. This could mark the start of Syria’s reintegration into regional stability, provided the transitional government consolidates peace and reform.

The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, commonly known as the Caesar Act, is a United States law that imposes wide-ranging sanctions on the Syrian government and its allies. Signed into law in December 2019 and implemented in June 2020, the act is named after a Syrian military defector code-named “Caesar”, who smuggled out tens of thousands of photographs showing torture and death in Syrian prisons.

Ahmed al-Sharaa

The Rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa

Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Golani, emerged as Syria’s interim president following the overthrow of Assad. Once a leader of the al-Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front, al-Sharaa has undergone a significant political transformation. Since assuming power, he has pledged to unify Syria, revitalize its economy, and transition towards an inclusive government. His efforts have garnered support from regional powers, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar, despite concerns over his past affiliations . (Reuters)

Ahmed al-Sharaa’s appointment as Syria’s interim president, despite his controversial past as Abu Mohammad al-Golani—the former leader of Jabhat al-Nusra—has elicited a spectrum of reactions from global and regional actors. While his political rebranding has been met with cautious optimism by some, others remain skeptical due to his militant background.

1. Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has taken a pragmatic and supportive stance toward al-Sharaa’s leadership. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has signaled willingness to support Syria’s reconstruction under the new leadership, provided it distances itself from Iran and extremism. Riyadh’s approach is rooted in:

  • Strategic realignment: A chance to pull Syria back into the Arab fold.
  • Counter-Iran agenda: Using Sharaa’s past anti-Iranian and anti-Hezbollah rhetoric as a basis for partnership.
  • Investment opportunities: Reconstruction efforts that benefit Saudi contractors and energy exporters.

2. Turkey

Turkey’s response has been largely positive, though cautious. Ankara views al-Sharaa as a more palatable partner than Assad, particularly due to his Sunni background and history of fighting Iranian proxies. Turkey’s interests include:

  • A buffer against Kurdish autonomy.
  • Repatriation of Syrian refugees.
  • Shared influence in post-war Syrian governance structures.

President Erdoğan has already hosted al-Sharaa in Ankara for talks on joint security arrangements and reconstruction logistics in northern Syria.

3. Qatar

Qatar, long a supporter of Syrian opposition factions, has enthusiastically welcomed al-Sharaa’s rise, portraying it as a victory for the revolution. Doha sees in him a:

  • Symbol of Islamist but nationalist governance.
  • Potential bridge between more radical opposition elements and the global diplomatic community.

Qatar has pledged humanitarian and technical support for the transitional government and is working to boost its media portrayal through Al Jazeera.

4. United States

The U.S. response under President Donald Trump has been surprisingly conciliatory. Trump’s administration, eager to showcase foreign policy wins in the election cycle, chose to:

  • Lift Caesar Act sanctions, citing the fall of the Assad regime and Syria’s chance at a fresh start.
  • Emphasize counterterrorism cooperation with Sharaa’s new administration, while urging a “complete and irreversible break” with extremist ideologies.

Nevertheless, the U.S. intelligence community and the State Department remain divided, with some officials voicing deep reservations about legitimizing a former jihadist figure.

5. European Union

The EU’s response has been measured and conditional. While welcoming Assad’s departure, European leaders have stressed:

  • The need for inclusive governance, human rights guarantees, and transitional justice.
  • An independent assessment of al-Sharaa’s current ideological stance and intentions.

Aid packages from Brussels remain contingent on progress in human rights, institutional reforms, and credible elections.

6. Russia

Russia, Assad’s staunch ally, is strategically recalibrating. Moscow has not outright rejected al-Sharaa, but it:

  • Expresses concern over the sidelining of its long-term investments and military bases.
  • Insists on security guarantees and future economic stakes, particularly in energy and port infrastructure.

Putin’s government is in quiet talks with al-Sharaa’s inner circle to preserve Russian access to Latakia and Tartus and to ensure that Russian companies retain reconstruction contracts.

7. Iran

Iran is the most antagonistic toward al-Sharaa. Tehran has denounced the transition as a foreign-engineered coup and has:

  • Withdrawn support from remaining militias in Syria.
  • Attempted to stir unrest among minority Alawite communities.
  • Pressured Iraq and Hezbollah to publicly reject the new Syrian government.

Iran’s declining regional leverage is further weakened by Syria’s pivot toward the Arab world and the lifting of U.S. sanctions.

8. Israel

Israel views al-Sharaa’s presidency with deep suspicion. While Assad was seen as a predictable actor despite being hostile, al-Sharaa’s past with extremist groups raises red flags. Israel’s primary concerns include:

  • Weapons proliferation near the Golan Heights.
  • Possible resurgence of jihadist activity under a disguised political front.
  • Ambiguity regarding future relations or recognition of Israel.

However, Israel has continued its air surveillance and targeted strikes on any movement it deems threatening in southern Syria.

Ahmed al-Sharaa’s rise to power has dramatically reshaped the diplomatic landscape around Syria. While his past raises valid concerns, his present offers hope for regional reintegration and reconstruction. Countries are largely taking a wait-and-see approach, balancing realpolitik interests with security apprehensions. Whether al-Sharaa proves to be a transitional figure or a long-term leader depends on his ability to deliver peace, inclusivity, and credible reform in a deeply fragmented Syria.

Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Interests

Saudi Arabia’s engagement with post-Assad Syria is driven by several strategic objectives:

  • Countering Iranian Influence: With the weakening of Hezbollah and diminished Iranian presence in Syria, Saudi Arabia aims to prevent any resurgence of Iranian influence in the region .(Arab Center Washington DC)
  • Economic Reconstruction: Saudi Arabia is poised to play a central role in Syria’s reconstruction efforts, offering financial assistance and investment to rebuild the war-torn nation .(New Arab)
  • Regional Stability: By supporting a stable and neutral Syria, Saudi Arabia seeks to enhance regional security and reduce the risk of further conflicts along its borders.

Diplomatic Engagement and Economic Cooperation

In early 2025, Syria’s newly appointed Foreign Minister, Asaad Hassan al-Shibani, made his maiden trip to Saudi Arabia, marking a significant step in the normalization of relations between the two nations . This visit was followed by a high-profile meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and President al-Sharaa in Riyadh, where Trump announced the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria, a move that was welcomed by Saudi leaders .(Al Jazeera, AP News)

Economically, Saudi Arabia has expressed interest in supplying oil to Syria, potentially replacing Iran as the primary energy provider. This shift not only addresses Syria’s immediate energy needs but also aligns with Saudi Arabia’s broader strategy to reduce Iranian influence in the region .(Economist Intelligence Unit)

Saudi Arabia likely played a critical behind-the-scenes role in the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria, particularly given the geopolitical realignment taking place in the region after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Here’s how and why:

Saudi Arabia has been working diligently to reintegrate Syria into the Arab fold, especially under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa. Its efforts to normalize Syria’s regional standing—through Arab League diplomacy and high-profile visits—helped shape international perceptions that Syria is no longer an Iranian satellite nor a rogue state.

By offering public diplomatic recognition to the new Syrian government, Riyadh gave Washington political cover to consider sanctions relief without appearing to reward extremism or dictatorship.

a. Coordinated Messaging with the Trump Administration

Donald Trump’s decision to lift sanctions was likely influenced by Riyadh’s assurances:

  • That the new Syrian leadership is anti-Iranian.
  • That Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies would oversee reconstruction and economic stabilization.
  • That they would pressure Sharaa to distance himself from jihadist rhetoric and engage in institutional reform.

This aligned with Trump’s broader strategy of burden-shifting regional stability to U.S. allies while claiming diplomatic wins at low cost.

b. Economic Incentives

Saudi Arabia stands to benefit economically from Syria’s return to global markets:

  • By investing in reconstruction projects.
  • By positioning Saudi firms to gain contracts in infrastructure, energy, and telecommunications.
  • By supplying oil and electricity to Syria, reducing Damascus’s reliance on Iranian crude.

Therefore, it had a vested interest in lobbying Washington for the removal of the Caesar Act and related financial restrictions that impeded such plans.

c. Counter-Iran Strategy

Riyadh’s strategic calculus is rooted in the containment of Iran. With the Assad regime gone and Iranian militias weakened, Saudi Arabia views lifting sanctions as a means to speed up Syria’s pivot away from Tehran.

By encouraging U.S. sanctions relief, the Kingdom not only helps rehabilitate Syria economically, but also ensures that Gulf influence—rather than Iranian leverage—shapes Syria’s new future.

d. Multilateral Gulf Support

Saudi Arabia did not act alone but coordinated with the UAE, Qatar, and Egypt, creating a unified Arab bloc that lobbied Washington for a new approach toward post-Assad Syria. This multilateral endorsement gave added legitimacy to the request and presented the lifting of sanctions as a pan-Arab policy shift, rather than a unilateral Saudi gambit.

Challenges and Considerations

Despite the promising developments, several challenges remain:

  • Internal Stability: Syria faces ongoing armed resistance and sectarian tensions, which could undermine efforts towards national reconciliation and stability.(Reuters)
  • International Relations: Israel views President al-Sharaa as a continued threat, complicating efforts to establish diplomatic ties and regional security arrangements .(Reuters)
  • Governance and Reform: Al-Sharaa’s commitment to implementing democratic reforms and establishing inclusive governance will be critical in gaining the trust of both domestic and international stakeholders.

Conclusion

The re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia represents a significant shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics. While challenges persist, the strategic alignment between the two nations offers a pathway towards regional stability and cooperation. The coming years will be crucial in determining the success of this new partnership and its impact on the broader Middle Eastern landscape.

Saudi Arabia’s role was pivotal in softening Washington’s stance on Syria. Through a combination of diplomatic reassurance, economic planning, and regional leadership, Riyadh helped reframe Syria’s new government as a potentially stabilizing force in the region. The lifting of U.S. sanctions is thus not just a Trump initiative, but a reflection of Gulf consensus, with Saudi Arabia at the helm.


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